The Strategic Planning of EU Military
Operations - The Case of EUFOR TCHAD / RCA. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2008 by Mattelaer, Alexander
IES WORKING PAPER  5/2008
The Strategic Planning of EU Military 
Operations - The Case of EUFOR TCHAD / RCA
Alexander Mattelaer
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Strategic Planning of EU Military 
Operations—The Case of EUFOR TCHAD / 
RCA 
 
Alexander Mattelaer 
 
 
  
 
All rights reserved. 
No part of this paper may be published without 
the permission of the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute for European Studies (IES) is a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence. The IES 
operates as an autonomous department of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). It hosts 
advanced Master programmes and focuses on interdisciplinary research in European Studies, 
in particular on the role of the EU in the international setting. Within this scope, the IES 
also provides academic services to scholars, policy makers and the general public.  
The IES Working Paper Series is a collection of scientific articles on policy-relevant issues 
that deal with the EU in its international context. The Series reaches across multiple 
disciplines, including law, political sciences, social sciences and economics. Instructions for 
sending Working Paper submissions as well as comments may be found at the Working Paper 
Series’ homepage (see www.ies.be).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN Number: pending 
© Alexander Mattelaer  
Institute for European Studies, VUB 
Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium 
 
 ABSTRACT 
On 28 January 2008 the European Union launched the military operation EUFOR in Chad and 
the Central African Republic. Its mandate was to contribute to the security of the civilian 
population, the numerous refugees from neighboring Darfur and the local presence of the 
United Nations. This paper describes and analyses the planning process of this operation at 
the political-strategic and military-strategic levels with the aim of understanding how the 
military instrument was intended to generate the desired political effects. The paper 
argues that, from a military perspective, the EUFOR operation is based on the concept of 
humanitarian deterrence: the threat of military force is used to discourage potential 
spoilers from targeting the civilian population. As with any military operation, the planning 
of EUFOR was plagued by various elements of friction. At least some of this friction seems 
to flow from the mismatch in expectations between the political-strategic and military-
strategic levels. The various political and military-technical constraints within which the 
operation was planned resulted in an operational posture that is less decisive than what the 
political ambitions would have suggested. 
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1 INTRODUCTION1 
In the course of 2008, the European Union (EU) launched a military operation in eastern 
Chad and the northeast of the Central African Republic (CAR), codenamed EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA.2 On the one hand, this paper will provide a detailed overview of the planning 
process of this operation. How did we get from the political decision-making process to the 
arrival of a sizeable, multinational force in the middle of the desert, thousands of 
kilometres away, several months later? On the other hand, this paper analyses the military 
strategy of the operation – i.e. how the operation intended to achieve the desired political 
effect through the (threatened) use of military force.3 Planning and strategy are intimately 
interlinked. In a general sense, planning is looking into the future and mitigating the course 
of future events through policy measures. In the context of a military operation, this is 
precisely what strategy is about. It is in the planning phase of an operation that political 
and military affairs meet. Policymakers set the aims and allocate the resources, whereas 
the military constitutes the instrument to implement the chosen policy. Strategy is the 
nexus where all this comes together. It encompasses the political debate over ends and 
means as well as the military discussion over how these can be linked together in a causal 
framework of action and effect. At the level of the analytical framework, therefore, the 
focus of this study is on the political-strategic level of the EU institutions and the military-
strategic level of the Operation Headquarters (OHQ) level.4 
This paper cannot hope to cover all issues relevant to crisis management in Chad in detail. 
It can only briefly introduce the conflict in Chad itself. The role of the United Nations (UN) 
in managing the regional conflict will be mentioned insofar as necessary to understand the 
role EUFOR plays in the broader efforts of the international community. In the same vein, 
this paper does not venture into the tactical level on the ground. It will not discuss at 
length the practical details that the EUFOR soldiers struggle with on a daily basis. This is 
not to say that these various issues do not merit discussion. The main interest here, 
however, is to dissect the planning process of EUFOR at political-strategic and military-
strategic levels in order to gain an understanding of how the operation intended to achieve 
its objectives. 
                                                
1 This paper is entirely based on open source, non-classified information and material gathered during 
a series of 18 research interviews with diplomatic and military officials conducted in the period July-
October 2008. All interviews were held under Chatham House rule, i.e. based on the understanding 
that all received information could be used freely but without revealing the identity or position of the 
person interviewed. Next to the interviewees, without whom this project would have been 
impossible, the author wishes to thank Sven Biscop from the Egmont Institute and Eva Gross from the 
IES as well as a number of officials from the Belgian armed forces for their instructive comments on 
earlier versions of this paper. 
2 In this paper the shorthand ‘EUFOR’ will be used to refer to EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Whenever there can 
exist any confusion with other EU operations the full names will be used. 
3 Although there exist heated semantic discussions about the concept of strategy (see Strachan 2005 
and Biscop 2007), this discussion uses the word in the narrow military sense coined by Clausewitz 
1976 and developed by, inter alia, Gray 1999. 
4 In terms of the levels of analysis, this paper will follow the definitions offered by the EU Concept for 
Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level. Herein the political-strategic level is located at 
the Brussels institutions, the military-strategic level at the OHQ, the operational level at the Force 
HQ (FHQ) and the tactical level at the component HQ. The distinction between military-strategic and 
operational levels is somewhat confusing and can be disputed on historical as well as theoretical 
grounds (cf. Strachan 2005). 
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The relevance of this research, consequently, lies in enhancing the understanding the 
usefulness and limitations of military operations in the toolkit of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). Contrary to the well-developed body of work focussing on how to 
manage the transition from conflict to peace,5 the paper zooms in on the issue of military 
strategy in crisis response operations. EUFOR, for that matter, is the most recent, longest 
and largest autonomous military operation the EU has conducted so far. Considering the 
setting, both in terms of geography and the conflict background, a convincing case can be 
made that it is the most challenging and complex operation of the EU to date. In that 
sense, this paper gives an update of where the ESDP stands in developing the machinery for 
conducting military operations. The case study of EUFOR then sheds light on how the 
translation from the political aims into military reality in one particular setting can look 
like, and by what problems this process it can be plagued. 
In a nutshell, this paper argues that the procedurally well-developed ESDP planning system 
in the case of EUFOR suffered from a mismatch in expectations between the political-
strategic and military-strategic level. On the political level, EUFOR was motivated by a 
variety of considerations. Most EU member states were not wiling to devote substantial 
resources to the operation, but consented to what was essentially a French-driven initiative 
as long as some political restraints were met (i.e. impartiality and limited duration). The 
lowest common denominator in terms of mission objectives was to contribute to a Safe and 
Secure Environment (SASE). Within this political context, the planning of the operation at 
the military-strategic level resulted in an operational design based on the use deterrence 
for humanitarian purposes. The threat of military force would be used to discourage 
potential spoilers from engaging in any action that would undermine the security of the 
civilian population. The military planning system performed well in the face of major 
conceptual and practical hurdles that can be labelled under the heading of ‘friction’. 
Planning assumptions were uncertain, objectives were vague, no end-state was defined, 
the force generation suggested problems in political credibility, and multinational 
command and control arrangements were characteristically difficult. Within these 
parameters, an operation plan was produced for coping with a complex conflict 
environment.  However, this process implied a sense of realism about the limited role that 
EUFOR could play that unavoidably stands in contrast with grand political expectations. 
The structure of the discussion looks as follows. The first section describes the context of 
the operation. This includes a short introduction to the multi-layered conflict environment. 
It subsequently discusses the distinct roles played by other major players: the UN in charge 
of managing the regional conflict and France in its national role as former colonial power. 
The second section details the planning process of EUFOR. It starts by briefly introducing 
the ESDP operational planning process. It subsequently discusses the political-strategic 
debate in Brussels about whether to do the operation and for what purpose. This is 
complemented by an overview of the operational design on the military-strategic level. An 
overview of the highly politicised force generation process closes the second section. In the 
third section, the overall military strategy of ‘humanitarian deterrence’ is analysed from a 
conceptual perspective. It is discussed how the notion of deterrence can be framed in a 
context of expeditionary crisis management. The fourth section draws together various 
problematic issues in the planning process under the Clausewitzian concept of friction. It 
gives a non-exhaustive overview of some aspects in the operational planning that are highly 
                                                
5 E.g. Paris 2004. 
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problematic from a military or a political perspective. At this point, a number of general 
conclusions will be outlined. 
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2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 The Multilayered Conflict in Chad and the CAR 
In the east of Chad and the northeast of the CAR, around 240,000 refugees from Darfur 
region in the neighbouring Sudan and a rapidly rising number (170,000 by mid-2007) of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) flocked together in camps after having been uprooted by 
violence and generalised insecurity. Contrary to the misunderstanding that the situation in 
Chad is no more than a simple spill-over from the war in Darfur, the conflict context 
underlying this insecurity and corresponding population movements can be qualified as 
multilayered and highly complex.6 For analytical purposes, we can distinguish between (i) a 
multitude of local conflicts between various groups in areas that historically have known 
practically no effective governance, (ii) the various national conflicts for power that take 
place inside these states and (iii) the permanently ongoing confrontation between the 
states in the region, notably Chad and Sudan. It is important to keep in mind that all these 
conflicts occur simultaneously and consequently mutually affect each other. This 
omnipresence of armed activities fuels a systemic cycle of non-governance, criminality and 
impunity.  
In order to understand the security situation in the area it is useful to start at the local 
level. The Sahelian countries of Sudan, Chad and the CAR share borders drawn by former 
colonial powers that bear no relation to the ethnic demography of the region. Chad and the 
CAR can be qualified among the poorest countries in the world. This leaves state 
authorities with little resources to effectively govern their large territories. Demographical 
factors coupled to an intense competition for agricultural land, food and water lead to the 
widespread existence of conflict between local tribes. This level of violent conflict resides 
below national politics and can be interpreted as a struggle for survival in an extremely 
harsh environment. It is nearly impossible to draw a clear distinction between tribal fights 
on the one hand and criminality and banditry on the other. 
These small local conflicts exist alongside politically inspired rebellions. The regimes of 
Idriss Déby in N’Djamena (Chad), François Bozizé in Bangui (CAR) and Omar al-Bashir 
(Sudan) all face a multitude of rebel insurgencies. Historically speaking, insurgency comes 
close to being a permanent feature of politics in the Sahel. Chad has been riddled by civil 
wars most of the time since it became independent from France in 1960. In fact, not a 
single Chadian Head of State since independence acquired his position through non-violent 
means.7 Although these insurgencies are often portrayed as a simple confrontation between 
the Christian-African, agricultural south and the Arabic, nomadic north, their origin lies 
more in the socio-economic and political marginalisation of the peripheral regions of the 
country.8 Furthermore, the limited ability of the state authorities to provide effective 
governance over the entire territory, especially the lack of an effective police and legal 
system, provides an ideal breeding ground for rebel movements dissatisfied with the status 
quo.  The  trigger  to the  current rebellions  in Chad  was the decision of president  Déby in 
                                                
6 For in-depth analysis, see International Crisis Group 2008. 
7 Handy 2008. 
8 Prunier 2007a; 2008. 
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Figure 1. Map of Chad and planned EUFOR positions9 
2004 to amend the constitution and to run for a third term.10 The ensuing political 
alienation revitalised armed rebellion as means to express political grievances. Yet it is also 
crucial to bear in mind the fractious nature of this opposition to Déby. The various rebel 
groups do not form a coherent force and are united only in their opposition to the current 
regime. The hard core of fighters with refuge on the Sudanese side of the border reportedly 
                                                
9 Based on UN map N° 3788 Rev. 7. 
10 Handy 2008. 
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numbers between 3,000 and 5,000 men armed with machine guns and Toyota pick-up 
trucks. They pose a considerable threat to the regimes in power as the regular armed 
forces, though numerically superior, are of limited effectiveness.11 While these armed rebel 
groups have no interest in targeting the civilian population in Chad, they need to sustain 
their operations by ‘living off the land’, which often comes down to looting and preying on 
the civilian population. 
It is commonly accepted that the existence of a safe haven in a neighbouring country is of 
tremendous value for a rebel movement or insurgency. The highly porous Chadian-Sudanese 
border in this light seems like a recipe for trouble. It constitutes a remote and inhospitable 
area over which state authorities never had much control, with tribal affiliations ranging 
across the border in both directions. In 1990, the Chadian president Déby staged his own 
coup on N’Djamena from within Darfur. Historically, Déby’s ensuing regime was dependent 
on support from France and Sudan.12 When the war in Darfur in western Sudan erupted in 
2003, Déby originally supported the Sudanese crackdown on the Darfuri rebels. But as many 
of the Darfur insurgents belonged to Déby’s own tribe, the erosion of popular support for 
his own regime forced him to distance himself from Sudan. As the rebels from Darfur 
increasingly started using eastern Chad as their operating base and opposition against Déby 
rose, the situation slid into a condition of proxy warfare. Both governments accuse each 
other of – and are generally believed to be – arming rebel factions and offering safe havens 
on their territories, which has led to regular cross-border raids. 
2.2 Regional Conflict Management by the UN 
International involvement in the regional crisis started in the aftermath of the outbreak of 
the war in Darfur, and has taken many different shapes since then. The African Union (AU) 
undertook the first peacekeeping efforts in Darfur with the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). As 
this relatively small operation rapidly acquired a reputation of ineffectiveness, Resolution 
1769 of the UN Security Council transformed AMIS into the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in 
Darfur (UNAMID). The authorized troop strength was correspondingly raised from AMIS’s 
7,700 to 26,000 (military and police contributions combined). At present, however, it 
seems that UNAMID, currently 10,000 strong, is plagued by much the same problems as 
AMIS. 
Already in 2006, when the UN first contemplated taking over AMIS, the establishment of a 
multidimensional presence in Chad and the CAR was already evoked.13 From a military 
perspective, it made little sense to try and stabilise a given area, when the proxy war could 
continue across the border. As there seemed to be a relatively positive dynamic in Chad in 
the first half of 2007, the UN Secretariat came up with the plan of complementing the 
UNAMID deployment with an operation in eastern Chad. In the first outline of the plan, this 
multidimensional presence would encompass three components: civilian, police and 
military.14 The civilian pillar would become active in the domain of civil affairs, rule of law, 
human rights, humanitarian liaison and public information. The police pillar would involve 
some 300 international UN police officers training, mentoring and/or advising Chadian and 
CAR police staff in exercising a minimum level of order in and around the refugee camps. 
                                                
11 Seibert 2007, 15.  
12 Prunier 2007b. 
13 Cf. UN Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006). 
14 UN 2007a. 
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The military pillar, finally, would provide an umbrella of relative security under which the 
UN and the humanitarian aid community could achieve their objectives. In the first 
estimations, such a military force would involve an expanded brigade (some 6,000 troops) 
with a significant air component for enhanced mobility (option A) or an infantry division 
(10,900 troops) which would rely more on infantry presence and less on air mobility (option 
B).  
Early on, it became clear that Chadian president Déby was unfavourable to a military 
presence by the UN.15 It was in this context that EUFOR, under French lead, would 
eventually come to serve as a politically more palatable alternative to a military operation 
under UN flag. In the light of the historical relationship between France and Chad (cf. 
infra), the Chadian regime viewed a French-led force with less suspicion than an operation 
run by the UN. Subsequent developments led to a situation were the EU operation would 
provide the military security umbrella, whereas the political and humanitarian pillar would 
work through various channels (the UN, the European Commission and their various 
representatives and the NGO community). Finally, the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations would run the police mission MINURCAT (United Nations Mission in the Central 
African Republic and Chad). MINURCAT would be composed of 300 police and 50 military 
liaison officers and would be tasked to train and advise elements of the Police tchadienne 
pour la protection humanitaire (relabelled into the Détachement intégré de sécurité) and 
to liaise with all actors involved. This Chadian police force was intended to become 850 
strong in order to provide security in the refugee and IDP camps.  
Once this multidimensional presence moved into deployment phase, it soon became clear 
that the UN police mission MINURCAT was much slower in becoming operational than 
EUFOR. The delay in the deployment of the Chadian gendarmerie units was consequently 
even bigger. Small-scale violence and banditry that needed to be tackled by police units 
rather than EUFOR’s attack helicopters thus continued even when EUFOR was in place.16 In 
what follows, it should therefore be kept in mind that EUFOR plays but one part in a 
broader scheme, i.e. that of providing a military security umbrella in Chad and the CAR. If 
anyone, it is the UN that tries to manage the regional conflict. The UN does so with the 
various instruments it has at its disposal but it also faces daunting challenges. These 
problems reach from military overstretch to the political unwillingness that can be 
detected on the side of the local governments – who, after all, remain the primary actors in 
this conflict. 
2.3 The Double Role of France in Context 
France played a key role in putting the situation in Chad on the agenda of the EU. For this 
reason, it is well warranted to highlight some elements of immediate relevance in the 
historical relationship between France and Chad. From independence in 1960 onwards, 
Chad – like most other former French colonies – signed various military assistance 
agreements with France. These bilateral agreements allowed France to keep military bases 
in the territory, as well as have rights to transit and over-flight. In return France 
guaranteed external territorial security to its colonies and would consider all requests for 
assistance in the face of insurgencies and coup attempts. In addition, France provided 
equipment, training and advice to the Chadian armed forces. On several occasions during 
                                                
15 UN 2007a, § 33. 
16 Oxfam 2008. 
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the Cold War, France launched military interventions in Chad to maintain stability or keep 
an embattled regime in power.17 In the context of Chadian-Libyan tensions, France in 1986 
deployed Operation Epervier, a military task force with a heavy air component. It has 
remained stationed in Chad until the present day. 
In the spring of 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy won the French presidential election and assumed 
office on 16 May. Bernard Kouchner is appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who in 
the past had frequently voiced grave concern about the regional crisis around Darfur. On 21 
May 2007, all foreign offices of EU member states receive word from Paris about a proposal 
to do something in eastern Chad. In the words of one interviewee, “Kouchner played a 
crucial role in pushing for the deployment of EUFOR”. Against the background of the 
historical relationship between Chad and France, the eventual EU operation would come to 
play a limited role in a more complex scheme of French Africa policy. The humanitarian 
efforts in the area enjoyed widespread support in the international community, making the 
UN and the EU the obvious policy vehicles. More sensitive issues, such as military 
assistance, would necessarily remain a part of the bilateral French-Chadian relationship. In 
this framework, EUFOR would simply be deployed alongside Epervier. Each operation would 
have its own mission description.  
The complexity of this situation became clearest when a coalition of rebels attacked 
N’Djamena on 2 February 2008. Several analysts suggest it was precisely the perceived 
ambiguity about EUFOR’s role that triggered the rebels to attack at the time EUFOR was 
starting its deployment: even the humanitarian work and associated stability was expected 
to benefit Déby more than it would the rebels. The attack on N’Djamena meant that Paris 
was caught between two sides. On the one hand there was pressure from its European 
partners not to compromise EUFOR’s imposed neutrality by intervening on behalf of Déby. 
On the other hand there were Déby’s requests for assistance, which France had honoured in 
the past – most recently in 2006. As a result, actions were seen on both fronts. Firstly, 
French Epervier forces most likely provided indirect support (i.e. intelligence, logistical 
support and advice) to the Chadian armed forces that were fighting the rebels, but 
refrained from entering into direct combat themselves.18 Through simultaneous lobby work 
France obtained the approval of the UN Security Council for a direct intervention if this 
would have been required in the near future.19 Secondly, the French EUFOR Force 
Commander underlined in straightforward terms that EUFOR would not meddle in the 
conflict between Déby and the rebels but was only there to protect the civilian population 
and the UN. 
                                                
17 Collelo 1988a. 
18 Arteaga 2008; Handy 2008. 
19 Le Monde 2008. 
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3 THE PLANNING PROCESS OF EUFOR 
With this background in mind, it is time to turn to the focus of this discussion, namely the 
planning of EUFOR. The central question is how EUFOR was intended to achieve its political 
objectives. In order to structure the discussion, we will follow the different steps in the 
planning process. The first subsection therefore briefly outlines how this process looks like 
in theory. The second subsection focuses on the initiation phase at the political-strategic 
level in Brussels. The third subsection sketches the lines along which the operational 
planning was conducted at the military-strategic level. The focus here lies on how the OHQ 
interpreted its political guidance and conceptually developed an operational design. The 
fourth subsection deals with the force generation process, where the political-strategic and 
military-strategic levels met. 
3.1 The ESDP Operational Planning Process 
In order to meet the complex challenge of planning operations, military institutions have 
developed a body of doctrine and procedures. The ESDP structures are not different in this 
regard: a planning process has been developed and is regularly revised. As most EU member 
states are also NATO members, ESDP planning procedures are very strongly inspired or 
simply copied from the available NATO doctrine. This subsection sketches a broad outline 
of how the operational planning process works in the case of military ESDP operations.20  
 
Figure 2. Operational Planning Disciplines 
As outlined in Figure 1, operational planning is divided into two major consecutive 
disciplines: advance planning and crisis response planning. Advance planning relates to the 
planning for possible security threats. In the ESDP framework, this can assume the form of 
either generic planning (drawing up catalogues of what capabilities are available for ESDP 
operations and comparing those with those that are required for pre-identified standard 
scenarios)21 or strategic contingency planning (ongoing monitoring of the security 
environment and drawing up non-detailed contingency plans to inform political decision-
making). Once the political level, embodied by the 27 national ambassadors sitting in the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC), decides that “EU action is appropriate”, the switch 
is made from advance planning to crisis response planning. This concerns the development 
of a response to an actual crisis, the end result being a detailed Operation Plan (OPLAN) 
ready for execution. Crisis response planning is itself a multi-layered process. At the 
                                                
20 The crucial documents in this regard are the Suggestions for Crisis Management Procedures, the EU 
Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level and the EU OHQ Standing Operating 
Procedures. 
21 Giegerich (2008, 16-22) offers a detailed description of this branch of planning. 
Advance planning  "EU action is appropriate" decision  Crisis response planning 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political-strategic level, political authorities in consecutive steps define the broad outlook 
of the operation. At the various military levels below – military-strategic, operational and 
tactical – an iterative process is started in which the guidance from the level above is 
analysed and translated into plans of increasing levels of detail. 
The first step in the political-strategic initiation of crisis response planning is the 
development of a crisis management concept (CMC). This is a policy document agreed by 
the PSC containing a political and military assessment of the situation. As such it is a multi-
pillar document outlining the role of the different instruments the EU has at its disposal for 
reacting to the crisis. The Council Secretariat (DG E VIII), the EU Military Staff and Military 
Committee (EUMS and EUMC) together provide the military input to the debate. After 
adoption by the PSC it is validated by the Council of Ministers under the GAERC format 
(General Affairs and External Relations Council). Following CMC approval, the EUMS is 
tasked with the development of Military Strategic Options (MSOs). These are possible 
outlines of military action designed to achieve the politico-military objectives outlined in 
the CMC. They outline the military course of action and required resources. These options 
are prioritised by the EUMS and commented upon by the EU Military Committee (EUMC). 
Subsequently, they are put forward to the PSC for debate and the GAERC validates the 
chosen option. After this the Joint Action can be produced: a legal act by which the Council 
formally establishes the operation, appoints the operational commanders and OHQ and 
fixes a reference amount for the common costs inherent to the operation.22 The EUMC, 
supported by the EUMS, translates the Joint Action into an Initiating Military Directive 
(IMD). This documents provides military guidance for the Operation Commander. This 
process is summarised in Figure 3 below.23 
 
Figure 3. Crisis response planning at the political-strategic level 
From this point onwards, the various headquarters (OHQ at the military-strategic and FHQ 
at the operational and tactical level) can kick into action. In terms of doctrine, the EU OHQ 
Standard Operating Procedures essentially follow the NATO Guidelines for Operational 
Planning. The first step is a detailed analysis of the guidance given by the level above 
(orientation phase). Secondly, different courses of action are developed and compared with 
one another (concept development). Thirdly, the preferred course is developed into a plan 
(plan development). Fourthly, plans receive regular reviews when they are put into 
practice (plan review). At the military-strategic level of the OHQ, the key documents 
                                                
22 The notion of operational commanders refers to the Operation Commander who is responsible for 
the overall design of the operation and functions as the politico-military interface in the planning and 
conduct of the operation, and the Force Commander who directly commands the forces deployed on 
the ground in theatre.  
23 Based on the EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level. 
Crisis Management Concept Military Strategic Options Council Joint Action Initiating Military Directive 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produced in this process are thus the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation 
Plan (OPLAN). The CONOPS is a concise statement of how the Operation Commander 
intends to fulfil his mission whereas the OPLAN is the highly detailed script of the entire 
operation. Both the CONOPS and the OPLAN are approved by the EUMC and politically 
endorsed by the PSC and the Council. This process is visualised by Figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 4. Crisis response planning at military-strategic level 
In parallel to the process of plan development, but separate from it, runs the process of 
force generation.24 Alongside the CONOPS, the Operation Commander produces a 
provisional Statement of Requirement indicating the means he needs in order to be able to 
fulfil the mission. In a series of force generation conferences – a process not limited in time 
– the participating member states pledge assets and capabilities for the operation in a 
dynamic of supply and demand. Once plan development is completed, the OPLAN validated 
and all the essential (mission-critical) elements of the Statement of Requirement are 
fulfilled, the Council of Ministers can formally launch the operation. 
Before turning to the case of EUFOR, a brief note should be made about the EU’s capacity 
in strategic contingency planning. While the EU Military Staff was already tasked with 
strategic advance planning since its inception, in practice it was only allowed to do so in 
specific cases once the decision that ‘EU action is appropriate’ had been taken. The reason 
for this is that the Council does not want to signal future action too soon. Of course, the 
problem with this set-up is that this very decision about appropriateness cannot be taken 
without a basic assessment of the situation and what can possibly be done about it. At the 
informal EU defence ministerial in Wiesbaden in March 2007, it became clear that it was 
required “to get the first bit of planning right”.25 Correspondingly, at the GAERC in 
November 2007 the EUMS received wider authority to engage in strategic contingency 
planning as outlined above.26 With regards to the timing, it should be kept in mind that this 
strategic contingency planning capability was not yet up and running when the discussions 
about a possible operation in Chad started. As a result, the planning for EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
started in a more ad hoc mode. 
 
                                                
24 The reference document is the EU Concept for Force Generation. 
25 Summary of remarks by Javier Solana 2007. 
26 Council Conclusions on ESDP 2007, 6. 
Orientation Concept 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Plan 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3.2 The Political-Strategic Initiation Phase of EUFOR 
As already indicated, the very first mentioning of the idea of conducting an ESDP operation 
in Chad can be found in a diplomatic cable the French ministry of foreign affairs sent to all 
other EU foreign ministries on 21 May 2007. For the German presidency this was clearly no 
priority, but the incoming Portuguese presidency put the proposal back on the agenda. The 
Council Secretariat and the Commission were tasked to propose a catalogue of possible 
actions. In the words of one official, this involved both “killing the stupid ideas” (such as a 
no fly zone or a humanitarian corridor) and “proposing something useful and coherent with 
the instruments we have”. A jointly drafted Options Paper was released the 13th of July. In 
this document, the security dimension was especially emphasised, as this was felt to be the 
wish of  the  initiating member state.  At the GAERC of 23 July, the Council Secretariat was 
 
EUFOR Planning Milestones27 
 
21 May 2007   France suggests an initiative for Chad 
13 July 2007   joint Council-Commission Options Paper 
23 July 2007   GAERC gives planning authority to Council Secretariat 
27 July  2007   PSC issues CMC tasker 
3 Sept 2007   OHQ pre-activation 
10 Sept 2007 PSC approves CMC and gives planning authority to Mont Valerien 
OHQ 
12 Sept 2007   Council approves CMC; MSO paper is released 
24 Sept 2007 indicative force generation conference; draft mission analysis 
brief reviewed 
25 Sept 2007   UN Security Council approves Resolution 1778 
4 Oct 2007   MSO 3 adopted 
15 Oct 2007   Council issues Joint Action; Operation Commander arrives in OHQ 
23 Oct 2007   Initiating Military Directive issued by EUMC 
8 Nov 2007   PSC adopts CONOPS 
9 Nov 2007   1st force generation conference 
12 Nov 2007   Council adopts CONOPS 
11 Jan 2008   5th and last force generation conference 
14 Jan 2008   Operation Commander presents draft OPLAN 
18 Jan 2008   Revised OPLAN released 
28 Jan 2008   Council accepts OPLAN and formally launches operation 
1-4 Feb 2008   UFDD-led rebel coalition attacks N’Djamena 
12 Feb 2008   EUFOR deployment restarts 
11 Mar 2008   Status of Forces Agreement signed 
15 Mar 2008   EUFOR reaches Initial Operating Capability 
17 Sept 2008   EUFOR reaches Full Operating Capability 
 
                                                
27 Overview based on data collected through various interviews. 
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given formal planning authority, and it was subsequently tasked by the PSC to prepare a 
Crisis Management Concept. In doing so, the Council staff could rely on preliminary work 
that had been done by the UN. Already in this period, a Joint Planning Group was formed in 
Paris, drawing on the French national HQ (Centre de planification et de conduite des 
operations or CPCO). It was clear early on that France would offer its OHQ rather than run 
the operation from within the EU Cell in SHAPE (the military-strategic NATO HQ) or the 
Operations Centre in Brussels.  
In line with the view of the UN, the CMC outlined a multidimensional presence. In the 
political domain, the EU Special Representative for Sudan, Torben Brylle, would receive 
additional authority to mediate in the complex regional dynamic. In the humanitarian 
domain, the Commission would pursue its long-term efforts under the Programme 
d’Accompagnement à la Paix. In the security domain, finally, the EU would undertake its 
own military effort to provide a security umbrella and financially support the UN’s efforts 
in police training. The embryonic essence of the military mission was laid out. 
Nevertheless, it would take until 12 September until the Council would accept the CMC. 
Inevitably, the debate over the CMC contained tough discussions about the motivations and 
logic behind the proposed operation. As one diplomat explained, the operation was sold to 
the national parliaments and the general public as a humanitarian operation – tasked to 
alleviate the humanitarian spill over from Darfur. In the closed debates, however, three 
motivating factors reportedly linked up with one another. First, there existed a French 
desire to do something in Chad. Rather than protecting Déby, this desire sprung from a fear 
of larger regional destabilisation – regional chaos expanding to Niger or even the Great 
Lakes region. A French diplomat put it as follows: “What we want in Chad is stability. The 
rebels aren’t any better than Déby, we simply wish to avoid a situation of continuous 
warfare affecting the broader region.” Second was the factor that the PSC had been 
debating the crisis in Darfur for ages. The frustration of being powerless led to an attempt 
to try and do at least something about the regional aspect of the crisis. Paradoxically, one 
diplomat noted, the member states most vocal about Darfur in the past (the UK and 
Germany, reportedly) were the most reticent about action. Third was the institutional 
factor. One year onwards from the EUFOR RD Congo mission and with the EU Battlegroups 
having become fully operational in January 2007, some felt it was time for a new military 
operation to foster the development of the ESDP as a crisis management tool. In this 
context the PSC debated a possible deployment of the Nordic Battlegroup into the eastern 
Congo as well. Chad soon emerged as another candidate, albeit not ideal for a battlegroup 
scenario.  
Overall, several interviews conducted with personnel from various permanent 
representations in Brussels concur with the analysis that different motivating factors were 
at play with regard to the Chad operation. There was a certain level of suspicion with 
regard to the French agenda in the debate. As a result, the neutral countries (led by 
Austria) insisted on a mandate emphasising the neutrality of the operation. A 
representative of one of the neutral member states summed it up as follows:  
We know the French have certain national interests in Chad and that they 
are in it with a somewhat different agenda. But without the French nothing 
would happen at all. By and large, we believe the French are honest about 
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this and trying to do the right thing. At the European level, the operation 
was launched for many different reasons of varying importance – there is no 
single dominant motive. 
Nevertheless, the suspicion amongst some member states with regard to the French agenda 
never disappeared completely. It was felt that however well intentioned the operation, in 
the end it would serve French interests the most. The argument here was that the Chadian 
infrastructure (airports, roads, camps etc) would be renovated with EU funds while the EU 
as such would not remain engaged long-term, leaving France as the main beneficiary of the 
investment. In this context it should also be noted that the “EU action is appropriate”-
decision was never formally taken in the case of EUFOR. Instead, the CMC tasker was 
retroactively interpreted as such. Depending on one’s point of view, this can be read as an 
example of procedural flexibility or an attempt to push through a decision by stealth. 
Following the adoption of the CMC, the PSC gave planning authority to the French OHQ in 
the fortress of Mont Valerien, nearby Paris, and the EUMC issued a directive to the EUMS for 
the development of military strategic options. This process, however, had started on an 
informal basis already from the end of July onwards. While the OHQ had no commander 
yet, from mid-September national augmentees were sent in to multinationalise the 
command structure. The MSO directive itself was by and large resource-driven and defined 
in quantitative terms: the EUMS was asked to propose broad options for an operation 
involving roughly 1, 2 or 4 battalions. Initially, the EUMS identified two major tasks: (i) to 
support the UN in training police for the refugee camps and providing aid and (ii) to protect 
the IDPs and the general population, as it was felt the UN made the refugees their primary  
 
Military Strategic Options EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
 
1. Support Chadian forces in providing security in the area of operations 
Required capabilities: 1 manoeuvre battalion 
Problem of impartiality: this minimal option increases dependency on host nation support 
 
2. Putting priority on the protection of MINURCAT (= primary focus) and then the rest 
Required capabilities: 3 manoeuvre battalions 
Gradual geographical expansion: Centre  South  North 
 
3. Two lines of operation: (i) supporting the UN deployment and (ii) protecting the civilian population 
in a wider area 
Required capabilities: 4 manoeuvre battalions 
Rapid reaction, all at once deployment 
 
4. Same as MSO 3 but with specific dispositions for the CAR (EUFOR role limited to mentoring) 
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consideration.28 Eventually, the following set of options was put forward to the EUMC and 
the PSC, characterised in terms of the effects they would aim to achieve as well as the 
manner of deployment and the resources required.29 
While these options were being developed and discussed, two related events took place. In 
Brussels, on the one hand, an informal force generation conference was held in parallel to 
the initiating planning phase. One defence counsellor described the event as “a disaster”: 
practically no meaningful contributions (apart from the French) were made. In total the 
offers only added up to about half of the required forces. In New York, on the other hand, 
the UN Security Council authorised the mandate of both MINURCAT and EUFOR. Acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council defined the mission assigned 
tasks as follows: for a period of one year from Initial Operating Capability onwards, being 
authorized to take all necessary measures, 
(i)  To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly 
refugees and displaced persons; 
(ii) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free 
movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the 
area of operations; 
(iii) To contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, 
installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of 
movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel;30 
An earlier report by the UN Secretary-General had already excluded the possibility that the 
multidimensional presence would be involved in border control.31 One of the preconditions 
for Déby’s acceptance of EUFOR and MINURCAT was that only Chadian gendarmes would be 
allowed inside the refugee and IDP camps.32 It nearly goes without saying that in New York 
the French delegation at the Security Council was closely involved in drafting the 
resolution. Unsurprisingly, some EU member states more skeptical of the operation felt that 
a close link existed between Paris and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 
New York.  
In the discussion about the options paper, MSO 1 and MSO 4 were soon abandoned. The 
minimal footprint sketched in MSO 1 would increase the dependency on host nation support 
to such an extent that neutrality and impartiality would become impossible to guarantee. 
The monitoring approach offered by MSO 4 was felt to be a non-starter, proposed mainly in 
order to generate an illusion of choice. This left MSO 2 and MSO 3 which were largely seen 
as variants of the same idea: option two was more realistic from a political point of view, 
option three was ideal from a military perspective.33 Notwithstanding serious doubts over 
its level of ambition, MSO 3 was adopted. Of course, this debate was not only about what 
                                                
28 The impression at the EUMS was that the UN initially saw EUFOR as the military arm of their own 
operation, whereas the Europeans from the start wanted to put their own priorities as well, notably 
with regard to the IDP problem. As Kiszely (2008, 12) generalises, in multi-organisational campaigns 
“each line of operation tends to pride itself on its independence”. 
29 Information obtained through various interviews. 
30 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007). 
31 UN 2007b, 5. 
32 Seibert 2007, 17. 
33 Ideal in terms of resources, that is. In terms of logistics, taking into account the limitations of local 
infrastructure, it is clear that a rapid full deployment would have been highly challenging. 
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effects the mission should seek, but also about the resources it would require – an aspect 
that would remain in the spotlight throughout the force generation process. In the run-up 
to the Joint Action establishing EUFOR, this led to serious disagreements over the reference 
amount for the common costs of the operation to be split between member states.34 At 
first, the EUMS suggested an amount of 420 million EUR to the RELEX group. Through 
negotiations, this amount was reduced to 99,2 million EUR, although it grew again to 
around 120 million EUR at the start of the operation in January 2008. 
On the 15th of October, the Council produced the Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP – the legal 
act formally establishing the operation. In doing so, Mont Valérien was officially appointed 
as the EU OHQ, as were LtGen Patrick Nash and BGen Jean-Philippe Ganascia as 
respectively Operation Commander and Force Commander. In terms of content, EUFOR was 
labelled as a military bridging operation, a concept developed earlier in the context of EU-
UN cooperation in crisis management. From the start, the expectation was created that the 
EU would conduct a mission for one year upon which the UN would take over with a mission 
of its own – even though no concrete arrangements for doing so were made. In accordance 
with Resolution 1778, it only stated that an evaluation of the need for a possible follow-up 
would be held six months after EUFOR achieved Initial Operating Capability. During the 
following week, the EUMC prepared the Initiating Military Directive, which translated the 
Joint Action into military guidance. This directive identified that the strategic objective of 
the operation should be to contribute to a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE). The 
directive also imposed constraints (obligations) as well as restraints (prohibitions): the 
force should maintain an impartial and neutral posture and not become involved in the 
ongoing confrontation between Déby’s regime and the various rebel groups. As a result, 
from 23 October onwards, the military planning process could make a formal start.  
3.3 The Military-Strategic Operational Design of EUFOR 
3.3.1 The Orientation Phase 
By the time the Initiating Military Directive arrived in the Mont Valerien, a lot of effort had 
already gone into getting the EUFOR OHQ up and running. The OHQ had been pre-activated 
on September 3rd, received planning authority on Sept 10th and was boosted with 
augmentees a few days later.  The first task was to import all necessary information and 
expertise in the skeleton HQ structure. For this purpose, all factors having an influence on 
the operational planning are listed in a so-called Three Column Estimate together with 
their implications for the operations and corresponding conclusions. This working 
document, which was already partially ready by September, effectively functioned as the 
way to familiarise the arriving augmentees with the dossier and formed the basis for 
mission analysis. 
The three mission tasks were defined in the UN Security Council Resolution 1778 mandating 
EUFOR. The political-strategic objective was to contribute to a SASE. In military terms, this 
translated into two objectives. On the one hand, EUFOR would provide security to 
                                                
34 The financial cost of a military ESDP operation is split into individual costs, i.e. pertaining to all 
distinct national contributions to the operation, and common costs that relate to the multinational 
backbone of the operation, such as preparatory missions, headquarters and infrastructure. Individual 
costs ‘lie where they fall’, i.e. each contributing state pays for itself, whereas common costs are 
financed jointly through the ATHENA mechanism, a Gross National Income-based distribution key. 
(Mattelaer 2007, 82-83). 
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MINURCAT so that the UN could in turn do its job of training the police to provide security 
in the refugee camps. On the other hand, EUFOR would foster a sense of security to 
encourage the return of IDPs. The strategic centre of gravity of EUFOR for drawing strength 
for achieving these objectives was its credibility. In the given context it was a formidable 
force with firepower (both of its infantry personnel and the availability of close air 
support), reconnaissance capability (allowing it to see threats from afar) and aerial 
mobility (allowing it to send reinforcements quickly wherever needed). But apart from 
military capability and the Rules of Engagement to use it, the credibility was also based on 
the notion of impartiality. The determination to stay out of the struggle for power would 
give EUFOR complete independence of action – on the ground in Chad, it would not require 
anyone’s authorization to act. This in turn required adequate resources, deployment and 
sustainment in a distant and inhospitable theatre. As a result of these requirements, the 
vulnerability of EUFOR lay both in the political process in Brussels and in the logistical 
sustainment challenge in theatre. 
Already in the orientation phase, however, the planners had to tackle the two major 
constraints imposed by the political-strategic level. On the one hand, the operation had to 
be neutral and impartial – terminology used by policymakers without being clearly defined. 
Although semantically related, military personnel do not see these terms as synonyms. 
Neutrality is interpreted as not affecting the political situation at all, while impartiality is 
interpreted as applying your influence in an even-handed manner. In this context, 
impartiality means reacting to threats to civilians or the UN no matter where the threat 
comes from whereas neutrality would mean not to interfere at all. In any case the politico-
strategic constraints meant that no clear-cut adversary was available. On the other hand, 
the political level had identified an end-date (the operation will last 12 months from Initial 
Operating Capability onwards) rather than an end-state (the operation should achieve 
objectives x,y and z). As the operational planning process is originally developed for high-
intensity combat operations, these constraints together with the tasks identified in the UN 
mandate and the nature of the conflict context itself brought the planners into uncharted 
waters. The terminology of operational planning, correspondingly, had to be stretched to 
its semantic limits. 
For structuring the Opposing Forces (Opposing forces) situation, the planners made 
recourse to the concept of spoilers.35 The phrase was originally coined by the scholar 
Stephen Stedman and refers to  
leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations 
threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to 
undermine attempts to achieve it.36 
In the context of Chad and the CAR, all armed groups who could pose a military threat to 
SASE were labelled as spoilers. This included rebels, militias, bandits as well as government 
forces (for example in the hypothetical case of escalation of the proxy war between Chad 
and Sudan into a conventional conflict). One can differentiate between these actors in 
terms of their aims and motives and correspondingly lump them together into three 
                                                
35 On a methodological level, it should be noted that the terminology of ‘opposing forces’ for this 
very reason is being abandoned in favour of ‘relevant forces’ or ‘parties in conflict’. This underlines 
the point that the complexity of operational planning increases dramatically with the vagueness of 
the mission. 
36 Stedman 1997, 5. 
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categories: (i) the Chadian rebels with the aim of overthrowing Déby, (ii) armed militias of 
tribal nature and (iii) CAR rebels and bandits of Sudanese origin. What these three 
categories have in common is that they oppose the establishment of a SASE on the basis 
that an environment riddled with criminality and impunity suits their activities. In this 
sense, the use of the spoiler concept allowed an application of the ‘own forces’ vs 
‘opposing forces’ framework, even when there was no adversary on the political level: 
opposing forces are all potential threats to the UN and the civilian population. Of course, as 
the spoiler concept functions as a catch-all formula, this complicates Opposing forces 
centre of gravity analysis.37 Tactically, all groups could be analysed individually, but on the 
strategic level their centre of gravity remained a vacuum. On the operational level, one 
can go no further than saying that all spoilers derive their strength from the general 
impunity to conduct criminal activities. This leads to near infinite sustainment capability, 
but with vulnerable lines of communication. For this reason, strategic planners felt it was 
best to concentrate on their own centre of gravity. 
The absence of a clearly defined end-state constituted a second major problem. EUFOR was 
tasked to maintain a condition (contribute to SASE) for a pre-specified duration of 12 
months rather than achieve a clearly defined outcome. In terms of operational design, 
Lines of Operation could not converge towards an end-state or the defeat of an opposing 
forces centre of gravity.38 As a result, EUFOR lines of operation ran parallel. The following 
four lines of operation were identified, with corresponding ‘decisive points’ (which were 
reportedly rather fuzzy than decisive). 
 
Figure 5. The four lines of operation 
In terms of security, EUFOR would deter the use of force against the UN presence, 
refugees, IDPs and the civilian population. In terms of logistics, it would sustain itself and 
guarantee its freedom of movement, improve transport infrastructure and contribute to the 
free movement of MINURCAT. Regarding diplomacy, it would open up lines of 
communication to all actors and support mediation efforts wherever possible. The notion of 
                                                
37 Centre of gravity analysis is a military methodology for analysing strengths and weaknesses of all 
conflict parties (cf. Eikmeier 2004). 
38 In operation design, decisive points are those from which a centre of gravity can be threatened. 
These are linked together into lines of operation that represent the conceptual path connecting an 
actor’s centre of gravity and objectives. 
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supporting operations can perhaps best be understood as perception management: through 
information operations (communicating), PSYOPS (influencing), CIMIC activities and an 
extensive liaison network it would maximally foster a sense of security. Improving the 
security situation was felt to be as much a matter of perception as well as of the number of 
security incidents. In any event, the security situation would be hard to measure in 
quantitative terms. For example, there were no statistics available about the security 
situation prior to EUFOR deployment. Even if there had been, one planner remarked, the 
number of reported incidents might very well have risen because the presence of EUFOR 
meant that now there was at least always someone to report to. 
Fast-forwarding to the plan review phase halfway into the operation, the operational 
design picture could be complemented by the prospect of a follow-up force under UN flag. 
This would be realised by expanding MINURCAT with a military component post 15 March 
2009.39 This follow-up force would at least initially rely on European troop contributions 
and benefit from a separate planning cell in New York (not unlike the planning 
arrangements for UNIFIL II). At the time of writing, it seemed likely the EUFOR 
contributions from Ireland, France and possibly others would continue to operate under the 
auspices of the expanded MINURCAT operation. In theory, such a UN force would be able to 
adopt a more long-term perspective than EUFOR. In the view of the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, a 10 to 15 year timeframe would be required to make progress 
towards achieving a self-sustaining SASE. Over this time horizon, rather than the twelve 
months of EUFOR, it would be possible to have converging lines of operation.  
2.3.2 Concept Development 
From the operational design it was reasonably clear what role EUFOR saw itself playing: the 
main effect to be achieved was to make the local population feel to be more secure. The 
next question was how to do this in practice. In very broad terms, this question was already 
part of the MSO debate. MSO 2 foresaw a gradual build-up of the EUFOR presence 
throughout the area of operations: arrive in the centre (Abéché), then expand south and 
finally north. At the same time it would functionally expand from a monitoring presence to 
a more robust peacekeeping role. MSO 3 aimed for an accelerated, rapid build-up in all 
three zones simultaneously, producing a shock effect affecting the mindset of all players.  
It was clear from the outset, however, that the discussion about deployment timeframes 
would be heavily affected by logistical considerations. The logistical challenges for EUFOR 
have been described in detail elsewhere.40 The area of operations is located 2,000 km from 
the nearest seaport and 4,450 km from Brussels. Airport facilities in Chad are very limited 
in their throughput capacity while strategic airlift is very expensive and inadequate for 
large cargos. As Host Nation Support in the area of operations is nearly non-existent and 
reliance on local resources (e.g. water) would be highly counter-productive, EUFOR would 
need to autonomously lift in everything it would need. As a result, EUFOR could not escape 
from long transit times (35-45 days): 12-20 days sealift from Europe to Cameroun, 10-15 
days road transport through the Douala corridor to N’Djamena plus an additiona 5-10 days 
by road to Abéché. The deployment that was realized (build-up to Initial Operating 
Capability in about five weeks) was deemed to be close to the maximum possible. 
Therefore, all planning considerations were severely constrained by geography and 
                                                
39 The planning process of the expanded MINURCAT operation falls outside the scope of this 
discussion. See UN 2008b for more information. 
40 Seibert 2007. 
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logistics. One could vary the weight of the different building blocks of the force and move 
them around a bit, but there were no radically different courses of action available due to 
logistical constraints. 
The idea of varying the thrust of the deployment contained in the MSO discussion was also 
reflected in the debate about possible courses of action. On the one hand there was the 
idea of synergy, which was based on the simultaneity of deployment and maximal co-
location between EUFOR and MINURCAT. On the other hand there was the idea of 
situational focus: to concentrate the central effort in the Goz Beida area, as it is the main 
passageway for armed groups, and to have a Quick Reaction Force in Abéché ready to 
intervene elsewhere as a sort of mobile fire-brigade whenever required. Eventually a mix of 
these two approaches was used. The area of operations was divided into three zones, 
North, Centre and South.41 In order to achieve co-location with MINURCAT, EUFOR bases 
would be deployed to Abéché as Force Headquarters and six forward locations: Bahia, Iriba 
and Guéréda in the north, Forchana and Goz Beida in the centre and Birao in the south. 
Nevertheless, the idea remained that the central effort was to lie around Goz Beida.  
The reasons behind this choice were twofold. On the one hand it was related to geography: 
the north being more mountainous and the south having more state boundaries (in this 
context functioning as hideouts) in its vicinity makes the Goz Beida area the most 
attractive passageway for the movement of armed groups. On the other hand the focus on 
Goz Beida was related to the migration problem at hand. The main bulk of camps with 
refugees from Darfur is located in the north. This refugee problem would require a long-
term solution to the war in Darfur. The war in Darfur is a variable EUFOR could not 
influence. As a consequence, the residual task in the north was limited to deterring attacks 
on the UN and the refugee camps. Towards the south, however, one finds mostly camps for 
internally displaced persons. From EUFOR’s perspective, this constituted a more fluid 
situation. As it is an indigenous problem, it was felt to be an issue EUFOR would have more 
influence over. As there is at least the possibility of increasing confidence amongst the IDP, 
it offers the most potential for change and hence the best prospects for success. 
As a result, the six forward bases would have slightly diverging roles. The northern area 
(Bahia, Iriba, Guéréda) with the main refugee presence would require a permanent 
deterring EUFOR presence for security operations.42 This can best be understood as police 
action with very potent rules of engagement. Towards the centre (Forchana and especially 
Goz Beida) the mixed refugee and IDP situation would require a more robust security 
presence. This required more focussed engagement: the same deterrence-based modus 
operandi but more concentrated and specific. The presence in the CAR, an area mostly 
plagued by banditry and movements of armed groups, again required deterrence of a 
mobile, intelligence-driven nature.  
These varying deterrence postures are based on being seen and on showing what the force 
is capable of. ‘Being seen’ is achieved through vigorous patrolling. Such patrols can be both 
short-range (several hours) and long-range (several days). Especially the random pattern of 
                                                
41 LtGen Patrick Nash Press Conference. 
42 In practice, the presence in the north would be built around Iriba rather than three separate bases. 
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night patrols was deemed to have significant deterrent effect on large-scale criminality.43 
‘Showing what the force is capable of’ is done through precision-targeted combined joint 
operations. These can be of demonstrative nature in order to increase visibility but can also 
constitute intelligence driven interventions against specific threats or potential incidents. 
These operations would take place in the Forchana and Goz Beida area. They involve up to 
250 personnel from several member states (hence combined or multinational). They would 
also be joint (i.e. inter-services) in involving an air component of 7 to 9 helicopters and a 
ground component of 70 to 80 vehicles. 
Of course, the instruments commanders have at their disposal for achieving their mission 
are intimately bound up with the dimensioning of the entire operation. Together with the 
CONOPS, the Operation Commander prepares a Statement of Requirements. In this process 
a troop-to-task analysis has to be completed: determining what the force needs to do and 
what type and size of force are required to do so. While troop-to-task analysis at the 
tactical level is a fairly straightforward process, it is very difficult at the strategic level. On 
the one hand, the tasks are described in more general terms and allow for more room for 
interpretation. On the other hand, there is little established doctrine available in this 
domain. Some general force sizing criteria (such as the number of security personnel 
relative to population size) have merit but easily generate very large forces.44 The 
experience of actual crisis response operations shows that such parameters often yield 
impossible requirements. 
EUFOR planners did not resort to force sizing parameters based on demography and 
geographical size. Instead, the Statement of Requirement was based on the force ratio vis-
à-vis potential opposing forces. The general idea was that a contingent in any isolated site 
should not be inferior to a company. The reasoning was that a smaller force would not have 
the critical mass to guarantee its freedom of manoeuvre. Of course it would be possible 
that EUFOR contingents could come under threat from armed groups that are numerically 
far superior. With reconnaissance support, however, it was deemed that such threats could 
be detected beforehand. The contingents, which would in any event have an important 
technological advantage, could then be reinforced by the Quick Reaction Force in Abéché 
and could call in close air support as a last resort option. The Statement of Requirement 
was thus build on the idea that all bases required at the minimum one company and the 
Goz Beida camp two companies. This leads to a total Statement of Requirement of 10 
companies: 2 in Goz Beida, 5 in total for the other forward bases, 1 as Quick Reaction Force 
in the FHQ in Abéché and another 2 companies spread out over all camps for force 
protection purposes. This provisional Statement of Requirement of ten companies 
(equivalent to just over three battalions) was well in line with the discussion over the 
MSOs. Apart from the companies, however, the force would require important enablers 
such as tactical transport capability for increased mobility and reconnaissance assets.  
3.4 Force Generation and EUFOR Capabilities  
While the essence of operational design and military strategy is about how to achieve the 
desired effects, an important preliminary requirement is to obtain the means required to 
be able to do so. In the current security environment, this is by no means self-evident. This 
                                                
43 During the actual operation, for example, a night patrol encountered an ambush site at which a 
clash ensued between EUFOR troops and an unidentified armed group. This event was judged to send 
an important signal that armed robbery is no longer a risk-free enterprise. 
44 Quinlivan 1995. 
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can be explained at the national level by budgetary constraints or an unwillingness to 
assume risk (these two factors add up to political will) and military overstretch (the 
practical availability of capabilities may be blocked by other engagements). It is the 
Operation Commander who needs to define what he needs and to ask the political 
authorities of all participating states to provide him with the proper means. This 
negotiation process over resources, which runs independently from the operational 
planning itself, is called force generation. It tends to be a highly politicised process where 
the result is invariably a compromise between military needs and political acceptability.45 
On 8 October the PSC adopted the CONOPS prepared by the Operation Commander. This 
(strategic level) CONOPS was accompanied by a provisional Statement of Requirement. The 
following day, the first formal force generation conference was held. In total, five formal 
force generation conferences (preceded by an informal indicative one) would be needed 
before EUFOR could be launched. This lengthy force generation process is one of the main 
elements in explaining why the operation was up and running only a full ten months after 
the operation had been first suggested. One interviewee described the force generation 
process as “a game of poker”. In the minds of several delegations there seemed to exist an 
expectation that France would by default provide the essential means for making the 
operation a reality. It was France, after all, that had proposed the operation in the first 
place. Furthermore, France lobbied intensively for it, even though the other major ESDP 
players – the UK and Germany – had immediately indicated they would not participate 
(apart from staff in the OHQ) because of their engagements in Afghanistan. As a result, the 
other member states had only a limited incentive to make sizeable contributions as they 
expected the French to assume most of the burden anyway. Yet this proved to be a 
misperception: the French were well aware that this would become the third military ESDP 
operation in Africa and it was again going to be dominated by French personnel. Both in 
terms of making the ESDP sustainable as a European project as well as averting criticisms of 
neo-colonialism and national interests, French dominance in the mission was seen as 
undesirable. At the fifth and last force generation, France grudgingly provided the essential 
assets to be able to start the mission. Nevertheless, the mission was launched without the 
strategic reserve being covered for and with shortfalls in reconnaissance capability.46  
Initially, 14 member states pledged ground contributions and 22 sent staff contributions to 
the OHQ in Mont Valérien. Eventually, 23 EU member states plus Albania and Croatia at 
some point had personnel in theatre. The major contributions of land forces came from 
France, Ireland and Poland. They took the lead over the multinational battalions, based in 
Forchana, Goz Beida and Iriba, respectively. A French-led Logistics Battalion was based in 
Abéché together with the Special Operation Forces component. The special forces would 
constitute the initial entry force and subsequently provide special reconnaissance and 
surveillance as well as a rapid reaction capability for emergencies.47 In terms of air assets 
for reconnaissance and close air support, France provided the fixed wing capacity through 
double-hatting Mirages and unmanned aerial vehicles from its Epervier contingent based in 
N’Djamena. A multinational helicopter pool was established with French, Polish and Irish 
                                                
45 Kiszely 2008, 8. 
46 Unofficially, the absence of a strategic reserve did not cause a major worry as planners considered 
it “inconceivable” that the French Epervier contingent would not come to the aid of EUFOR if a dire 
situation would occur. 
47 Note that Belgium took command of the special forces component of the operation from 15 
October 2008 to 15 March 2009. 
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contributions and an offer from Russia (4).48 These helicopters were crucial for tactical 
airlift, but also for medical evacuation and close fire support, functioning as an important 
force multiplier by providing greater mobility and operational flexibility. 
Another word is in place about the MSOs. The chosen option (MSO 3) initially foresaw four 
battalions. As discussed above, the provisional Statement of Requirement prepared by the 
OHQ was calculated in terms of companies rather than battalions. The OHQ demanded for 
ten companies of which it eventually got nine. This force would be deployed in a sequential 
build-up from the initial entry force in the centre, first towards the south (Goz Beida) and 
then towards the north (Iriba). Although the OHQ did not lower its level of ambition in the 
face of a difficult force generation, the eventual outcome did resemble MSO 2 more than 
MSO 3. While there was pressure to start the deployment sooner rather than later so as to 
allow for a full build-up before the rain season, the launch had to be delayed until the 
mission essential requirements were fulfilled. This put a burden on the Operation 
Commander not to take rash decisions, yet not to be overly dogmatic either. Planners seem 
to agree, however, on the thesis that the overall force volume was relatively coherent with 
the mission and that the launch was not forced by political pressure. Thus, after the 
fulfilment of mission critical requirements and the approval of the OPLAN, the Council 
could formally launch the operation on 28 January 2008. 
                                                
48 Pour la petite histoire, it is interesting to observe that the offer of Russian helicopters was already 
announced in the March 2008 but never made concrete. The technical agreement drawn up by Russia 
was only presented mid August 2008, i.e. about one week after the war in Georgia. While it was 
somewhat embarrassing that the EU was discussing sending monitors to Georgia to verify the 
withdrawal of Russian forces there and simultaneously received an offer for Russian help in Chad, it 
was decided early September that the Russia offer would be accepted in order to increase operational 
effectiveness. 
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4 EUFOR STRATEGY ANALYSIS: HUMANITARIAN DETERRENCE 
The formal tasks set out in EUFOR’s mandate – contributing to the protection of refugees 
and IDPs, facilitating humanitarian aid and protecting the UN presence – give the operation 
a military-humanitarian character. It amounts to military action not with the intention of 
defeating an adversary, but to provide greater security and enable humanitarian work.  
From a planning perspective, the crucial question is how these tasks should be completed. 
The short answer is that the key strategic objective of EUFOR was to contribute to a SASE. 
This would be achieved tactically by vigorous patrolling, an extensive information 
campaign, liaisoning with all parties on the ground and continuous intelligence work. This 
section discusses in detail how the link between the strategic objective and the action on 
the ground is supposed to function. In other words: how would it for EUFOR be possible to 
generate the intended effects? 
First, a remark is on the nature of the conflict context is due. Considering the imposed 
neutrality and impartiality contained in the UN mandate as well as the CMC and subsequent 
planning documents, it should be clear EUFOR was not intended to engage in any open 
conflict with a distinct adversary. It would be more appropriate to say EUFOR would deploy 
in a context of ongoing confrontation between the regime in N’Djamena, various rebel 
groups with a political agenda, and other armed groups that can be labelled as bandits. 
EUFOR’s principal role was to inject a modicum of stability in order to alleviate the 
humanitarian situation. This meant that EUFOR was to position itself as an independent 
actor in the ongoing confrontation. It would not search open conflict, yet it would attempt 
to prevent the occurrence of more violence affecting the humanitarian situation. In other 
words, it would attempt to influence the intentions of other armed actors so that they 
would not resort to the use of force. Deterrence can be understood to be the key concept 
underlying the strategy of this operation.  
The concept of deterrence embodies the idea that the presence of a military threat 
discourages potential adversaries from undertaking any unwanted action out of fear for 
retaliation.49 It is the threat of military force that changes the cost-benefit calculations of 
possible opponents. It qualifies as a massive psychological operation. The opponents can be 
states as well as non-state actors, or even a population in general. Deterrence is equally a 
conceptual part of any penal and law enforcement system: you should not break the law or 
otherwise you are punished.  Deterrence often plays a major role in military crisis 
management. Apart from the (deterrence-based) policing role intervention forces 
sometimes fulfil, it remains a widespread idea that external military forces by their mere 
presence constitute a stabilising factor in a conflict environment. Yet deterrence does not 
come automatically from the presence of a stick. It assumes that the opponents are 
rational actors with cost-benefit calculations that can be changed. In order to do so, the 
actor who wishes to deter something must clearly define what action would not be 
acceptable. He must communicate his intentions about action and reaction. Furthermore, 
the deterring actor needs to be credible: materially, he needs to possess the means to 
react, and psychologically he needs to show the resolve to retaliate.  
                                                
49 Deterrence as a concept was originally theorised in depth by Schelling 1960. 
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It is not entirely straightforward to define in what sense this is a deterrence-based 
operation. This is partly due to the semantic confusion between nuclear and conventional 
deterrence – nuclear deterrence being far better known – and partly due to the inherent 
fuzziness of the political context: there is no clear adversary to deter. At the level of 
political deliberations, the concept received little prominence, if mentioned at all. On a 
more technical level, however, the situation was quite different. In the subsequent reports 
of the UN Secretary-General on the military component of the multidimensional presence in 
Chad, the following is a recurring phrase:  
The military component would assist in protecting civilians at risk, 
facilitate delivery of humanitarian relief, and seek through its presence to 
reduce tension and deter conflict, with a view to establishing a more 
secure environment in its area of deployment.50 
Senior EU military officials extensively used the same discourse. The Chairman of the EUMC 
stated “we cannot underestimate the deterrent effect of the deployment of a very robust 
European force”.51 In this sense, the use of a deterrence strategy was predetermined from 
the start rather than a choice on the side of the Commanders.  As a result, Force 
Commander Ganascia could make the point very clear in public:  
Mon mandat est très clair. A partir du moment où ces personnes [des 
soldats dévoyés, des rebelles ou des bandits] exercent une menace militaire 
sur la population, attaquent les ONG, la Minurcat ou mes hommes, je dois 
agir. Tant qu’ils passent leur chemin, je ne suis pas concerné.52 
Statements like these fit the deterrence concept perfectly in the sense that they clearly 
set the threshold of what is not acceptable and when action will be taken. Next is the issue 
of credibility: having the means and resolve to retaliate. It is in this light that we can best 
interpret EUFOR’s self-identified strategic centre of gravity. It is remarkable that EUFOR, 
which operates with the consent of the host nations and with humanitarian tasks, was 
provided by the UN Security Council with a Chapter VII mandate and correspondingly robust 
rules of engagement.53 Together with the mandate, EUFOR has at its disposal what one 
interviewee labelled “an absolute overkill in firepower”. In this reasoning, the firepower of 
EUFOR’s modern weapon systems functions as a guarantee that the situation will not 
escalate into violence – simply because it is clear who would win the battle. The events on 
the ground seem to demonstrate the effectiveness of the threat. On one particular 
occasion, for example, an EUFOR patrol cornered an armed group that had stolen 
humanitarian aid supplies. Rather than risking confrontation, the goods were returned by 
the robbers with complimentary apologies.  
On the ground, the deterrence relies on the simple presence of EUFOR, the frequent 
conduct of patrols and targeted joint operations. On a conceptual level, the deterrence 
                                                
50 UN 2007a, § 58 – copied in UN 2007b, § 46 
51 Gen Henri Bentégeat Press Briefing. 
52 Quoted in Gros-Verheyde 2008. 
53 In UN peacekeeping jargon, traditional peacekeeping (in the sense of interposition between 
conflict parties after a ceasefire and / or peace agreement was concluded) is mandated under 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter, whereas peace enforcement (coercive action with a view to maintain or 
restore international peace and security) is mandated under Chapter VII. The term ‘robust 
peacekeeping’ is used for the grey area in between were the use of force is authorised on the tactical 
level to deal with spoilers. (UN 2008a). In the case of EUFOR, the combination of mandate and 
capabilities can be interpreted as going beyond the requirements of the ‘robust peacekeeping’ 
category. 
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follows from the presence of EUFOR rather than its mandate. The deterrence is not the 
mission of EUFOR, it is the strategic tool to achieve the objectives of the operation, which 
are all linked to a humanitarian purpose. In this sense, the overall military strategy – in a 
Clausewitzian sense of the word – could be labelled as humanitarian deterrence: the use of 
a military threat to discourage spoilers from engaging in action that undermines the 
security of the unarmed population. Armed groups can fight amongst each other, rebels 
can mount a raid on the presidential palace and government forces can hunt the rebels 
down – on the condition that the civilian population, the refugees and the UN are kept out 
of the fight and are not robbed and preyed upon as a means to sustain operations. 
The independence of action that EUFOR enjoys empowers it with a degree of influence over 
all conflict parties. The rebels are hindered in their freedom of manoeuvre and in some 
respects have to alter their behaviour so as to avoid confrontation. The activities of large-
scale bandit groups are disrupted, at least to some extent. Finally, EUFOR also has an 
influence on the governments in the region because EUFOR is present as a witness. Regular 
armed forces can no longer cross the Chadian-Sudanese border without being seen and 
caught on camera. This is deemed to have some deterrent effect in the proxy war with 
regard to provocations along the border. In this sense EUFOR plays a minor role in 
influencing the regional balance of power. As soon as it is present on the ground, it cannot 
avoid having an influence of its own (and hence not being neutral in the strictest sense of 
the word). Nonetheless, it can attempt to apply this influence even-handedly (impartially) – 
i.e. according to the interests of the civilian population. 
One can thus observe two paradoxes in the strategy. On the one hand, this strategy – which 
is designed to enable police work and humanitarian aid – relies on very robust military 
force. EUFOR can maintain the independence that is necessary for doing its job only by 
being the strongest kid on the playground. Whether this induces the other players to reach 
towards a political settlement is another question. On the other hand, any military 
operation will wield some influence of a more political nature, although it can be hard to 
predict which. While one can do no more than speculate about the ultimate rationale of 
the operation in the minds of key policymakers in European capitals, one could argue that 
an operation with a mandate containing humanitarian tasks will always have a political spill 
over effect from its simple presence. Along this line of thought, even a humanitarian aid 
operation would contribute to some level of containment of the political grievances in the 
region. The possible effect of EUFOR on the politics of the multiple conflicts in the region, 
however, would be hard to predict accurately beforehand. In terms of intentionality, it 
seems clear EUFOR’s immediate objectives were limited to deterring bandits, enabling 
MINURCAT and endowing the ESDP with more operational experience.  
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5 THE OMNIPRESENCE OF FRICTION 
The godfather of military theory, the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz, introduced the 
concept of friction, which he defined as the cluster of factors that distinguish real war from 
war on paper. Along this line of thought, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder famously stated 
that no plan ever survives the first contact with the enemy. Friction is a fundamental 
characteristic of strategy, and as such mitigates and limits the rationality involved in the 
strategy-making process. It can manifest itself as fundamental uncertainty or the role of 
chance. Yet it can equally be part of the intergovernmental bargaining process or 
organisational procedures. While crisis response operations like EUFOR may be different 
from war-fighting in many respects, they are certainly not less complex. The large number 
of actors present in theatre – EUFOR had to operate alongside the UN and deal with 
governments, rebel factions and NGOs alike – already guarantees as much. This section 
gives an overview of a number of domains in which friction was at play in the strategic 
planning of EUFOR. 
5.1 Planning Assumptions 
In the planning process – at all levels – it is often necessary to make planning assumptions: 
elements you do not know or over which you have no control, but without which you cannot 
plan. Lower levels of planning will generally treat these assumptions as facts. When such an 
assumption turns out to be incorrect, this may have profound implications for the plan in 
general. 
One of the key assumptions made by EUFOR – already on the political level – was that it 
would deploy alongside MINURCAT. This meant there would be a distribution of labour in 
the sense that EUFOR would deter military threats whereas MINURCAT would train police 
for dealing with criminality. This assumption turned out to be substantially flawed. 
MINURCAT was much slower in getting on the ground than EUFOR, which delayed the 
training and deployment of the Chadian police. In September 2008, only 300 Chadian police 
officers had been trained and none were deployed on the ground.54 In the process of 
preparing the deployment of EUFOR, however, this was not yet known. It was only once 
EUFOR arrived that it could observe that the police presence was not following on 
simultaneously. As changing EUFOR’s role in theatre would have required reopening the 
political process and as logistical and geographical constraints did not allow for much 
flexibility, the room for conceptual manoeuvre available to EUFOR was limited. This 
explains to a large extent why EUFOR is often qualified in the press as having little effect: 
it may have enabled an environment where police training could be done, but that in itself 
does not generate the security that the population and humanitarian community was 
craving for. 
5.2 Interpreting Objectives: What is a SASE?  
Amongst military personnel, the phrase ‘Safe and Secure Environment’ is commonly seen as 
the fuzziest mission one can receive. The concept can be understood to be so wide as to be 
                                                
54 Oxfam 2008, 15. 
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applicable to every conceivable contemporary operation. As one senior military officer 
explained: 
What does SASE mean? It presupposes the rule of law, relying on police, 
judiciary and border control mechanisms. It presupposes economical 
perspectives to make it sustainable. In essence, it presupposes a 
functioning state. But which of these elements can be achieved militarily? 
From a military perspective, a SASE can perhaps best be interpreted as the absence of 
military forces engaging in open conflict. This qualifies as the most basic precondition for 
all other aspects, but only a precondition. However, how to put this into practice brings us 
back to the complexity of conducting a troop-to-task analysis. 
As stated in its UN mandate, EUFOR was asked ‘to contribute to the protection of …’. 
Although one could remark that even the most minimal effort would already qualify, the 
relevant question here is what effort qualifies as a politically meaningful contribution. 
While EUFOR by most standards would qualify as an operation capable of making a 
significant difference, it remains self-evident that expectations on this matter will diverge 
and that the semantic difference between ‘contribute to a SASE’ and ‘ensure a SASE’ will 
be lost on a local population living in desperate conditions. 
5.3 The End-State vs End-Date Debate 
The planning of military operations is traditionally geared towards the achievement of an 
end-state, i.e. obtaining the situation upon which an operation can be terminated 
successfully. Planners expect this end-state to be defined prior to the operation itself: the 
idea is that you should know where you want to go before you set out, not simply follow 
your own nose. In traditional combat operations, this end-state tends to be the political 
counterpart to the military defeat the opponent’s centre of gravity. In this conceptual 
framework, the entire operational design is built upon lines of operation converging 
towards the centre of gravity and the end-state. In the EUFOR operational design, this 
analytical grid was not applicable. Rather than having an end-state, an end-date was 
defined. Consequently, the operational design consisted of parallel lines of operation that 
ended in mid-air. The political-strategic logic was built on the (at least initially) uncertain 
assumption that there would be a UN follow-on force with a much longer time horizon.  
The end-date concept has already received ample criticism. It was also applied in the 
context of the EUFOR RD Congo operation in 2006, which was limited to a duration of four 
months. In the lessons-learned process following this operation, it was already concluded 
that this was highly inadvisable. This begs the question why the EU does it again, thereby 
dismissing its own recommendations. An answer to this question can be found when 
considering the nature of the operations European armed forces currently undertake. These 
operations tend to be timeless: they are seeking a condition that must be maintained until 
a definitive political solution is found.55 This tends to be a process over which intervention 
forces have little control and which may take decades – or not come at all. In the former 
Yugoslavia, European forces have been engaged since 1992. In Lebanon, UN peacekeepers 
have been active since 1978. Peacekeeping history abounds with examples of operations 
that go on for years and years without any final agreement coming closer. From the 
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perspective of the EU, it may well be attractive to provide only an initial entry force – with 
the corresponding fanfare – and subsequently hand over the operation to the UN. This can 
be a cheaper long-term solution, albeit at the risk of overburdening a UN peacekeeping 
system that is already under systemic stress. 
It is worthwhile pondering what the difference between an end-state and an end-date 
means for the making of military strategy. When there is a clear traditional objective to be 
achieved – in the sense of ‘defeat’ or ‘occupy’ – this does not matter very much apart from 
adding time-constraints. When the objective is to maintain a SASE so as to allow for other 
action – be it police training or a political process – the implications are more profound. 
This objective can be sought through humanitarian deterrence as described above or 
through the simple physical defence of every single element in need of protection. In 
reality, it will always be a mix of the two, but it should be clear that the deterrence 
posture is more cost-effective than sending a military component along with every single 
police patrol. A strategy of deterrence, however, does not sit comfortably with the idea of 
an end-date. If it is known in advance that the military threat will be removed at a specific 
point in time, the strategic logic crumbles. A spoiler may simply choose to postpone his 
action until the military threat is withdrawn. In the case of EUFOR RD Congo, for example, 
the very scenario that the operation was intended to prevent – the contenders in the 
presidential elections resorting to the use of force – materialised with a couple of months 
of delay, after EUFOR RD Congo had left the country. Similarly, the military security that 
EUFOR Tchad / RCA provides through deterrence is unlikely to endure if there is a security 
vacuum after 15 March 2009. In order to be effective, therefore, any UN follow-on force 
should be equally credible as a deterrent. This means political credibility as an 
independent actor as well as military credibility in terms of having the required 
intelligence, mobility and firepower. 
5.4 Credibility as a Security Actor: Synchronising Operational Planning and Force 
Generation 
The issue of credibility is also a matter of political debate in the European context. As a 
strategic centre of gravity, credibility is a remarkably precious asset in what it allows an 
actor to do – it amounts to the idea that threats and promises will generate nearly the 
same effect as the use of force. Nevertheless, it is at the same time a vulnerable asset in 
the sense that it is difficult to build-up but easy to lose. It would be fair to say that the 
military-strategic credibility of EUFOR in the conflict theatre was beyond reasonable doubt. 
Although the force that was generated was small in numbers, all potential opposing forces 
were no match in terms of firepower and technological sophistication. In terms of local 
politics, the course of events so far seems to bear out that EUFOR can indeed follow an 
independent and impartial course. It did not intervene on behalf of Chadian government 
forces when they clashed with rebels. It did intervene when an unidentified armed group 
threatened an IDP camp near Goz Beida, leading to Irish EUFOR forces opening fire. One 
interviewee summed it up as follows: “Déby now accuses us of favouring the rebels while 
the rebels accuse us of protecting Déby. So I think we are doing well in establishing 
ourselves as impartial.” One could of course say that a SASE tends to benefit those in power 
more than the armed opposition, but within the military logic of the operation this was an 
unintentional consequence rather than a conscious intent. As a result, both the political 
and military credibility of EUFOR, once it was deployed, seems reasonably assured. 
However, reaching that point that was more problematic. 
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While the credibility of EUFOR as an actor in Chad and the CAR seems sufficient, the 
political-strategic debate and the force generation seems to be the Achilles heel of the 
credibility of the ESDP as a vehicle for military crisis-management. To some extent, the 
long-winded debate about the initiation phase can be said to be natural to 
intergovernmental policy-making. The lengthy force generation, however, confirms that 
the political will behind the operation was wobbly at best. If it takes six force generation 
conferences to obtain sufficient contributions for a relatively small force, there seems to 
be a lack of common interest among the member states. This is quite understandable 
considering the other ongoing military commitments of member states (notably 
Afghanistan) and the diverging geopolitical priorities (Russia causing more worries to policy-
makers in eastern Europe than humanitarian disasters in Africa). Nevertheless, a case can 
be made that a lack of political will should become clear from early on in the planning 
process so as not to generate unrealistic expectations.56 Moreover, it should be noted that 
this does not apply only to the EU: both NATO and the UN suffer from the same problem. 
At the fundamental level, this lack of determination and political priority can be explained 
as follows. Military operations emerging primarily from humanitarian considerations qualify 
as operations of choice rather than necessity.57 While the conflict in Chad may affect the 
interests of some European member states, there is no direct threat to the primary 
interests of any of these states, let alone the EU in its entirety. As a result, while few 
policy-makers (or their democratic constituents) will oppose such operations as a matter of 
principle, it is unlikely that these operations will be pursued with great determination. In 
this sense, these operations are more like diplomatic levers in which militaries can gather 
valuable experience as well as make themselves useful in peacetime rather than the 
ultimate raison d’être of the military, which still is to ensure the survival of the society 
from which it springs. This is not to say such operations are not worthwhile or that they 
should be treated as mere exercises – they are often as dangerous and difficult as any. The 
fact that they do not spring from the unambiguous core interests of a state, however, 
means that it is far more difficult to generate sufficient political will to bear their cost, in 
particular actual casualties. 
In practical terms, it can be concluded that the current arrangement – where operational 
planning and force generation are concurrent but separate processes – is probably not the 
best answer to flexible planning requirements. The EUFOR CMC was written without 
recourse to an official indication of available resources. At the indicative force generation 
conference, very few commitments were made. Nevertheless, planning went ahead. The 
full OPLAN was nearly ready at a time when it was not clear whether the mission critical 
capability requirements could be fulfilled. In other words, the implicit assumption was that 
France would provide the required resources at all costs – and this was a dubious 
assumption to make if one aimed to have a sound planning methodology in place. In order 
not to be planning in a vacuum, it is critical to have the operational planning and force 
generation processes work in tandem. Yet the making of military strategy should not be 
simply resource-driven either. The discussions about how to achieve the objectives and 
about how to generate the right task force cannot be conducted in two separate rooms. 
According to several interviewees, the political-strategic debate in Brussels was not so 
                                                
56 Cf. Giegerich 2008 for an extensive discussion about the gap between ambition and reality in the 
ESDP. 
57 Paraphrasing the opposition between ‘wars of necessity’ and ‘wars of choice’ developed by 
Freedman 1998. 
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much about what the operation should achieve as about what it could cost. In such an 
atmosphere, political credibility as a multilateral security actor becomes hard to come by. 
5.5 Activating a Multinational Command and Control Structure 
The EU has three possible command and control options for planning and conducting 
military operations: the EU Cell in SHAPE and the corresponding NATO command structure, 
the Operations Centre in the EUMS and one of the five identified national headquarters (of 
which only three are considered truly operational). As with the previous military operations 
in Africa, the last option was chosen. The French OHQ of Mont Valerien was activated and 
multinationalised by augmentees from all participating member states. Although the 
debate concerning EU command and control arrangements is highly politicised, a number of 
factual observations can be made on the operational level.  
First, feeding all relevant information into an otherwise inactive HQ is a time-consuming 
process for which adequate protocol is often absent. In the case of EUFOR, most of the 
practical information required for planning was present inside the French Centre de 
planification et de conduite des opérations, but it could not automatically be shared with 
the EU OHQ. Furthermore, the simple process of familiarising all augmentees with the 
operation and learning to work together requires time as well. In the estimate of one 
interviewee, getting a skeleton HQ up to work at full power takes about three months. The 
timely production of the key planning documents (CONOPS and OPLAN) is therefore 
critically dependent on an early activation of the HQ.  
Second, the activated OHQ is only a strategic-level HQ, not a complete command structure 
with adequate communications and information systems (CIS). In order to create a 
complete communication network, France inserted CIS teams in every EUFOR contingent. In 
other words, at the tactical level all contingents internally relied on their national 
communication systems, but in order to allow communications with the FHQ and higher up 
the chain of command, French equipment was inserted at each critical node. In terms of 
communication, therefore, it could be argued the heart of EUFOR lay in the French CPCO 
rather than in the EU OHQ of Mont Valerien. At one point, a proposal was made to move 
the CIS component completely out of Mont Valerien. As this would effectively dismember 
the OHQ structure, the proposal was turned down. It does show, however, that there 
existed a certain level of operational dissatisfaction with the present arrangements.  
Third is the issue of continuity. In the planning arrangements used for EUFOR, the initial 
military planning in order to inform the political-strategic process was done at the Council 
Secretariat and the EUMS. From September onwards, planning authority moved to Mont 
Valerien. While efforts were made to get liaison officers from the French defence staff to 
the EUMS in Brussels and subsequently from Brussels to the OHQ in Paris, this cannot fully 
prevent a temporary break in planning. Under current arrangements, the Initiating Military 
Directive arrives in the OHQ as if descending from heaven – without the same staff having 
been working on the initiating phase. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
This paper reviewed the political-strategic and military-strategic planning processes of the 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation with the aim of understanding how the operation was 
intended to generate the desired effects. First and foremost the paper shows that the EU 
has endowed the ESDP with an intricate set of planning procedures largely drawing from 
the NATO model and added a limited civil-military approach to it. This planning system has 
important merits: it is geared towards ensuring continuous political oversight, it structures 
the planning discussions and it allows for an incorporation of a wide range of relevant 
factors.  
Regarding the application of this planning framework to the conflict in Chad and the CAR, 
secondly, the paper shows an important split assessment of the political and military 
processes. On the one hand, it makes clear how the EU was able to plan and conduct an 
operation that was highly challenging from a military perspective. On the other hand, it 
illustrated how the difficulty of defining strong common European interests poses a 
structural weakness in the political credibility of the ESDP. The political-strategic planning 
of EUFOR cannot be cited as proof of the EU acting in a unified and resolute way. Rather 
than being a problem of procedures, this is a fundamental consequence of the diverging 
political priorities of the member states. 
Thirdly, the exploration of the actual operational design and concept development of 
EUFOR illustrates one type of military strategy developed to cope with the question of how 
one can achieve a malleable political objective such as a Safe and Secure Environment. A 
strategy of humanitarian deterrence, if sufficiently credible in terms of military capability 
and political intent, constitutes an answer. The effect that such a strategy enables, 
however, is only of a temporary nature and therefore unlikely to change the internal 
dynamic of conflict. In other words, as long as the extra time bought by deterrence is not 
put to use in the political domain, using other levers of power, such an operation will not 
have any lasting effect. 
Fourthly and finally, it should be clear that although the strategy of deterrence deserves 
proper study, security challenges such as the one in Chad pose problems for strategic 
theory in general. Apart from deterrence and direct defence, it is not clear how, given the 
constraint of impartiality, other concepts would allow for the transformation of a military 
effort into political effects. A political conflict can only be addressed directly by military 
means by entering into the conflict itself and choosing sides, with all the risks and hazards 
that this implies.58 The alternative is to keep the violent political conflict at arm’s length 
from the civilian population by deterrence. Whether one sees this as a nonsensical band-aid 
solution or as a chivalric effort to separate warring parties from civilians is a matter for 
debate. What does seem clear, is that any actor with the ambition of managing conflict 
militarily should brace himself for facing a lengthy and difficult job. 
                                                
58 Cf. Betts 1994. 
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